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DEFENSE WITNESS IMMUNITY

-A

"FRESH" LOOK AT THE

COMPULSORY PROCESS CLAUSE

Howard Mattheson, armed with a sawed-off shotgun, entered the
Hair-Wiz beauty salon accompanied by his wife. Mattheson immediately shot and killed the receptionist, and with the assistance of his wife,
he began to search the customers' purses. When one women refused,
Mattheson shot the patron next to her in the leg. At the trial, defense
counsel called Mattheson's wife to testify; she refused, invoking her
fifth amendment' privilege against self-incrimination. Defense counsel
asked that the jury be removed and requested the witness be granted
use immunity in exchange for her testimony. The trial judge refused,
and Mattheson was convicted of first-degree murder.2 At the sentencing hearing,3 defense counsel repeated his request, which was again
refused. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and
held that when a witness who is a prosecutorial target properly asserts
his privilege against self-incrimination, claims for defense witness immunity are properly denied by the trial judge absent actual prejudice
to the defendant. State v. Mattheson, 407 So. 2d 1150 (La. 1981).
The sixth amendment expressly guarantees the defendant in all
criminal prosecutions the right "to be confronted with the witnesses
against him [and] to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
in his favor."4 The confrontation clause' secures an opportunity for
the defendant physically to confront and cross-examine witnesses
presented against him in a court of law.' The compulsory process
Copyright, 1982 by
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1. "No person ... shall be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against
himself ...... U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. "[Tlhe killing of a human being: (1) when the offender has specific intent to
kill or to inflict great bodily harm and is engaged in the perpetration or attempted
perpetration of aggravated kidnapping, aggravated escape, aggravated arson, aggravated
rape, aggravated burglary, armed robbery, or simple robbery .... CRIMINAL CODE:
LA. R.S. 14:30 (1950 & Supp. 1979).
3. At the hearing, upon a unanimous recommendation by the jury, the defendant was sentenced to death by the trial judge. State v. Mattheson, 407 So. 2d 1150,
1155 (La. 1981).
4. In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall. have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
5. "[T]o be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend.VI.
6. See Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 71 (1974).
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* clause7 secures for the defendant "the right to present a defense, the
right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the
prosecution's."8 The confrontation and compulsory process clauses of
the sixth amendment were made applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment 9 in Porter v. Texas" and Washington v. Texas,"
respectively. The two clauses differ in that the confrontation clause
concerns itself with the procedures governing the manner in which
the prosecution presents its case, 12 while the compulsory process clause
deals with the defendant's affirmative personal right to present
testimony in his favor. 8
Traditionally, courts viewed the compulsory process clause as
granting the defendant the right to subpoena witnesses in his favor
to appear in court."' However, in Washington v. Texas, the Supreme
Court was called upon to decide whether compulsory process
"1guarantees a defendant the right under any circumstances to put
his witnesses on the stand, as well as the right to compel their attendance in court."' 5 The Court held that a Texas statute arbitrarily
denying persons charged as principals, accessories, or accomplices in
the same crime the right to each other's relevant and material
6
testimony at trial violated the defendant's compulsory process rights."
The Court noted that the Constitution could not have intended to give
the defendant the right to secure the attendance of witnesses whose
testimony he would have no right to use. 7 Though Washington did
not resolve the problem of "testimonial privilege"' 8 versus compulsory
process, this issue must be addressed if the defendant's sixth amendment rights are to be fully recognized.' 9
7. "[T]o have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor." U.S.
CONST. amend. VI.

8. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967).
9. The applicable portion of the fourteenth amendment states, "[Nior shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.

... U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

10. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
11. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
12. See Westen, supra note 6, at 74.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. 388 U.S. at 19.
16. Id. at 23.
17. Id.
18. The Court, noting that its decision did not address the problem of testimonial
privilege, stated, "Nothing in this opinion should be construed as disapproving
testimonial privileges, such as the privileges against self-incrimination . . . based on
entirely different considerations from those underlying the common-law disqualifications for interest." 388 U.S. at 23 n.21.
19. See, e.g., Westen, supra note 6, at 166-70.
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NOTES

The testimonial privilege problem arises when the selfincrimination clause of the fifth amendment is invoked by a witness
from whom the defendant seeks to compel testimony. This situation
is most commonly encountered when, as in Washington, a defendant
seeks the testimony of an alleged co-participant in the crime in
presenting his defense. The co-participant validly claims his privilege
against self-incrimination, and what might initially appear to be an
irreconcilable conflict arises. The conflict can be avoided, however,
through the use of immunity.
Immunity has been defined as "a state grant of amnesty in ex-

change for information."2 Congress recognized that the government's
need to obtain evidence in criminal prosecutions often conflicts with
a person's right against self-incrimination.' To reconcile this conflict,
Congress allows the government to compel needed testimony by granting immunity to a witness in exchange for his testimony.' This proMcLane, Immunity: A State Grant of Amnesty, 17 CRIM. L. BULL. 234,235 (1981).
See generally Foytack, Granting Immunity to Compel Testimony: Protection or
Illusion?, 3 CRIM. JUST. J. 151 (1979).
22. 18 U.S.C. SS 6002, 6003 (1976) read as follows:
S 6002. Immunity generally
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against selfincrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding before
or ancillary to(1) a court or grand jury of the United States,
(2) an agency of the United States, or
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a
committee or a subcommittee of either House,
and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness
an order issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with
the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no
testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information)
may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution
for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with
the order.
S 6003. Court and grand jury proceedings
(a) In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to testify
or provide other information at any proceeding before or ancillary to a court
of the United States or a grand jury of the United States, the United States
district court for the judicial district in which the proceeding is or may be
held shall issue, in accordance with subsection (b) of this section, upon the
request of the United States attorney for such district, an order requiring
such individual to give testimony or provide other information which he
refuses to give or provide on the basis of his privilege against selfincrimination, such order to become effective as provided in section 6002 of
this part.
(b) A United States attorney may, with the approval of the Attorney
20.
21.
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cedure allows the government to obtain needed evidence in carrying
out its prosecutorial and investigatory functions without violating the
privilege against self-incrimination.
Historically, the government was given the power to grant "transactional" immunity23 to a witness, awarding him "full protection from
prosecution for offenses to which the compelled testimony [related]""4
and totally isolating him from criminal sanction." Presently, however,
the government is empowered to grant "use" immunity26 to its
witnesses. Use immunity, unlike transactional immunity, only protects
the witness from subsequent prosecution using the compelled
testimony and its fruits." The government can later prosecute the
witness by using evidence obtained from a source wholly independent
of the compelled testimony.28 Thus, the prosecution is given statutory
authority to compel testimony in its favor by granting "use" immunity to a witness, while satisfying the requirements of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination." Further, as one commentator has aptly stated, "Unless the defendant can be distinguished
from the prosecution in significant ways, the defendant has a presumptive right to obtain use immunity for his witness on an equal basis
with the prosecution."' In fact, the compulsory process clause has
been interpreted to grant the defendant a constitutional right to obtain use immunity for defense witnesses in order to present his case."
The Supreme Court's opinion in Kastigar v. United States 2 supports
a compulsory process right to use immunity for a defendant.
In Kastigar, the Court held that "the immunity provided by [the
congressional act] leaves the witness and the prosecutorial authorities
General, the Deputy Attorney General, or any designated Assistant Attorney
General, request an order under subsection (a) of this section when in his
judgment-

(1) the testimony or other information from such individual may be
necessary to the public interest; and
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide other information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination.
23. See generally Foytack, supra note 21, at 156-58.
24. McLane, supra note 20, at 236-37.
25. McLane, supra note 20, at 236.
26. See generally Foytack, supra note 21, at 156.
27. See McLane, supra note 20, at 236-37.
28. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972).
29. See 18 U.S.C. SS 6002, 6003, quoted in note 22, supra.
30. Westen, supra note 6, at 168.
31. See Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980); U.S. v. Herman, 589
F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978).
32. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
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in substantially the same position as if the witness had claimed the
fifth amendment privilege. The immunity therefore is co-extensive with
the privilege and suffices to supplant it."3 Kastigar recognized that
the government need not grant full amnesty to a witness in exchange
for his incriminating testimony. Since a grant of "use" immunity leaves
the prosecution in "substantially the same position"' as if the fifth
amendment privilege had not been asserted, the government should
not have a valid objection to giving the defendant the same power
to compel testimony by a grant of use immunity. In either case, absent the grant of immunity, the testimony would not be available for
the court's consideration.
The government's primary argument against allowing the defendant the right to obtain use immunity in his favor is its present and
future interest in prosecuting the potential defense witness. 3 5 The
defendant's right to compel testimony favorable to his case is often
subordinated to the government's interest in subsequent prosecution
of the witness." Defense witness immunity raises the issue of whose
interest is to prevail: the government's or the defendant's?
In Roviaro v. United States," the Supreme Court faced the issue
of whether the government's privilege to withhold an informer's identity outweighed the defendant's right to present his defense. The
government's informer was the only person who would testify concerning the defendant's knowledge of a particular aspect of the crime.'
The government refused to disclose the informer's identity, effectively precluding the defendant from presenting his defense. In upholding
the defendant's request for the informer's identity, the court balanced
the public's interest in protecting the free flow of information
against the defendant's right to present an effective defense.39 Since

33. Id. at 462.
34. Id.
35. See Flanagan, Compelled Immunity for Defense Witnesses: Hidden Cost and Questions, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 447, 461-63 (1981); Comment, Defense Witness Immunity and
the Right to a Fair Trial, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 377, 391-98 (1980); Note, Separation of
Powers and Defense Witness Immunity, 66 GEO. L.J. 51, 71-76 (1977).
36. See generally Westen, supra note 6, at 167-68.
37. 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
38. In Roviaro, the defendant was charged with selling heroin to a government
informer. The informer's testimony "might have disclosed an entrapment . . . might
have thrown doubt upon petitioner's identity or on the identity of the package [sold]
. [or] might have testified to petitioner's possible lack of knowledge of the contents
of the package that he 'transported' . . . . Id. at 64.
39. Id. at 62.
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the informer's identity was crucial to the defendant's case,"° due process demanded that the informer's identity be revealed.'
In Davis v. Alaska, 2 the government's interest in protecting
juvenile offenders conflicted with the defendant's right to confront
the witness presented against him.43 The state sought to prohibit the
introduction of a juvenile probation record" by defense counsel in
cross-examining the adverse witness. 5 The Supreme Court upheld the
"petitioner's right to probe into the influence of possible bias
. ..
of a crucial identification witness," concluding that "the right of confrontation is paramount to the State's policy of protecting a juvenile
offender."48
In Davis, the defendant's constitutional right to confrontation
prevailed over the government's interest; in United States v. Nixon, 7
the Court expanded this protection to include the right to compulsory
process. 8 In Nixon, the President of the United States sought to quash
the subpoena duces tecum issued by a district court at the request
of the Watergate special prosecutor." The subpoena ordered the production of several tape-recorded conversations between President
Nixon and certain criminal defendants.' The president refused to produce the tapes, claiming an absolute executive privilege from federal
subpoena in criminal prosecutions. The Court refused to recognize
40. The Court, noting the importance of the witness, stated, "Unless petitioner
waived his constitutional right not to take the stand in his own defense, [informer]
was his one material witness . . . .[T]he sole participant, other than the accused, in
the transaction charged .... [Tihe only witness in a position to amplify or contradict
the testimony of government witnesses." Id. at 64.
41. The Court stated that prejudicial error had occurred when the government
was permitted to withhold the informer's identity from the defendant. Id. at 65.
42. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
43. "The tension between the right of confrontation and the State's policy of protecting the witness with a juvenile record is particularly evident ...." Id. at 314.
44. At the time of the trial, the witness was on "probation by order of a juvenile
court after having been adjudicated a delinquent for burglarizing two cabins." Id. at 311.
45. In Davis, the prosecution's crucial witness was a juvenile who testified as
to the defendant's involvement in the crime. Prior to his testifying, the prosecutor
"moved for a protective order to prevent any reference to [the] juvenile record
by
the defense in the course of cross-examination." The defense sought to introduce the
record to probe for possible bias and prejudice, to show the witness "acted out of
fear or concern of possible jeopardy to his probation." Id. at 310-11.
46. Id. at 319.
47. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
48. Id. at 708-09, 713.
49. Id. at 687-88.
50. See Id. at 687 n.3 & 688.
51. Id. at 706.
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an absolute executive privilege,"2 holding that a general executive
privilege prevails over judicial duty only upon a specific showing of
need by the executive branch.' As to the defendant's compulsory process right to obtain evidence, the Court stated, "The need to develop
all relevant facts in the adversary system is both fundamental and
comprehensive. . . . To ensure that justice is done, it is imperative
to the function of courts that compulsory process be available for the
production of evidence needed either by the prosecution or by the
defense.""4
The Nixon court emphasized the defendant's right to have all relevant and material evidence presented at trial, to insure that judgments
are not "founded on a partial or speculative presentation of the facts."'
The very integrity of our judicial system depends upon a full presentation of facts, within the framework of the rules of evidence, at every
criminal trial.5 6 The sixth amendment compulsory process clause
guarantees the defendant the right to present all evidence relevant
and material to his defense.
The right to present a defense has also been protected by the due
57
process clause of the fifth amendment. In Brady v. Maryland,
the
prosecution suppressed the confession of the defendant's co-participant
in the crime.58 The accused was tried, convicted, and sentenced, and
the conviction was affirmed by the Maryland Court of Appeals, before
the exculpatory evidence was brought to the trial court's attention.59
52. The Court concluded "that when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized
interest in confidentiality . . . [tihe generalized assertion of privilege must yield to
the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial." Id. at 713.
53. The Court stated, with reference to a presidential showing of need:
Absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security
secrets, we find it difficult to accept the argument that even the very important
interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly diminished
by production of such material for in camera inspection with all the protection
that a district court will be obliged to provide.
Id. at 706. See note 52, supra.
54. Id. at 708-09 (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 709.
56. Id.
57. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
58. In Brady, the defendant was tried separately from his co-defendant in the
case. At his trial, the defendant admitted participating in murder, but claimed his
companion did the actual killing. Prior to trial, the defendant requested his companion's extra-judicial statements from the prosecution. Several statements were shown
to him; however, the statement in which his companion admitted the actual killing
was not. Id. at 84.
59. Id.
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The Supreme Court held that the defendant's due process rights had
been violated by the government's suppression of requested evidence
material to his case.'
In Brady, the defendant's right to present evidence material to
his case was protected from prosecutorial interference, while in
Chambers v. Mississippi,l the defendant's right to present exculpatory
evidence was protected from statutory interference. In Chambers, the
defendant was denied the right to cross-examine a witness 2 by a state
rule of evidence." Another state rule of evidence also prevented
Chambers from presenting exculpatory evidence at trial. The
Supreme Court reversed Chambers' conviction and required a new
6
trial with the exculpatory testimony admitted into evidence. 1
Constitutionally, the defendant cannot arbitrarily be denied
relevant,1 material,6 7 or exculpatory" evidence by the government in
a criminal prosecution. In certain circumstances, the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination asserted by a witness denies the
defendant relevant, material, or exculpatory evidence favorable to his
case. Compulsory process could be interpreted to give the defendant
the right to such evidence through a grant of use immunity.
60. "We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable
to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either
to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Id. at 87.

61. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
62. The witness sought to be examined by the defendant had given a sworn confession to the defendant's attorneys that he, rather than the defendant, had killed
the victim. The witness also admitted telling one of his friends that he had shot the
victim. The defense put the witness on the stand at trial to introduce his sworn confession; however, the prosecutor on cross-examination elicited the fact that the witness
had repudiated his confession at an out-of-court hearing. The defense moved to examine the witness on cross-examination, claiming he was now an adverse witness. The
trial court denied the defendant's motion. Id. at 291.
63. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to cross-examine his own witness
based upon the state's "voucher" rule. The rule prevented a party from impeaching
his own witness, based upon the assumption that a party who calls a witness "vouches
for his credibility." Id. at 295-96.
64. The defendant also sought to introduce the testimony of three other men who
would testify that the witness told them he had committed the murder. The trial judge
refused to allow the introduction of this evidence; he based his decision upon the state's
hearsay rule. Id. at 294, 298.
65. The Court held that "It]he hearsay rule [could] not be applied mechanistically
to defeat the ends of justice ....
[U]nder the facts and circumstances of this case
...the trial court [had] deprived [the defendant] of a fair trial." Id. at 302-03.
66. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. at 63-64.
67. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. at 23.
68. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. at 297, 303.
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While the Supreme Court has not ruled on claims for defense
witness immunity, circuit courts have almost uniformly rejected such
claims. 9 The Third Circuit, however, has recognized the defendant's
right to claim defense witness immunity."0 In United States v.
Morrison," the Third Circuit held that due process demands that use
immunity be granted to a defense witness when prosecutorial misconduct occurs." The court protected the defendant's rights by ordering
the prosecution to either grant use immunity or accept a judgment
of acquittal."
While Morrison was decided under the due process clause, the
next Third Circuit case, Virgin Islands v. Smith," appeared to be based
upon the compulsory process clause. 5 In Smith, the Third Circuit gave
69. See, e.g., United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1982); United States
v. Lowell, 649 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. D'Apice, 664 F.2d 75 (5th Cir.
1981); United States v. Herbst, 641 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Davis,
623 F.2d 188 (1st Cir. 1980); Grochulski v. Henderson, 637 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1980); United
States v. Horwitz, 622 F.2d 1101 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d
769 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Cohen, 631 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1980); United States
v. Lenz, 616 F.2d 960 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. Klauber, 611 F.2d 512 (4th qir.
1979); United States v. Rocco, 587 F.2d 144 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Herman,
589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Saettele, 585 F.2d 307 (8th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Carman, 577 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Smith, 542
F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Alessio, 528 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1976).
70. In Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 973-74 (3d Cir. 1980), the court held,
"[In cases where the government can present no strong countervailing interest, a court
has inherent authority to immunize a witness capable of providing clearly exculpatory
evidence on behalf of a defendant who has met our stated conditions."
71. 535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1976).
72. In Morrison, the Assistant United States Attorney sent messages to the defense
witness warning her of possible prosecution if she testified. He also warned her of
possible prosecution for perjury if she testified. A subsequent personal interview with
the Assistant United States Attorneyintimidated her to such an extent that she refused
to answer some thirty questions at trial for fear of self-incrimination. The defendant
claimed he was denied vital evidence by the intimidating tactics of the prosecuting
attorney. Id. at 225-227.
73. Id. at 229.
74. 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980).
75. Smith involved a situation in which the defendant sought to introduce an inculpatory statement of a witness who refused to testify for fear of self-incrimination.
The statement indirectly exculpated the defendant; however, the trial judge refused
to allow the statement introduced into evidence. Defense counsel sought use immunity
for the witness; this was also refused by the trial judge. There was some question
as to whether prosecutorial misconduct occurred because the United States Attorney
refused to concur in the Virgin Island Attorney General's agreement to grant use
immunity to the witness. The Attorney General's office had predicated the grant of
immunity upon the United States Attorney's consent, and there was no reason given
for the refusal by the United States Attorney's office. The court appeared to base
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federal judges the power to grant "a judicially fashioned"' , immunity
to protect the defendant's right to present an effective defense." Smith
conditioned this immunity upon the satisfaction of six requirements
by the defendant:
(1) The immunity must be properly sought in the district court;
(2)

The defense witness must be available to testify;

(3)

The testimony must be essential in nature;

(4)

There must be no strong countervailing governmental interest;

(5)

The testimony must be clearly exculpatory;

(6)

The testimony must not be ambiguous, circumstantial, or
related solely to the credibility of the government's witness."8

Smith has been severely criticized by other circuits,7 and most circuits have refused to follow it. 0
1
the Fifth Circuit refused to grant imIn United States v. Herbst,"
munity at the defendant's request,"2 noting that Smith was a minority
view and that even if the court were inclined to follow it, an adequate showing had not been made in that case." The court in Herbst
refused to decide whether in some instances due process or compulsory
process demand that use immunity be granted to a defense witness,
its remand of the case to determine if use immunity should be granted to the witness
upon the compulsory process clause of the sixth amendment. The court defined judicial
immunity as court authority to grant immunity to a defense witness to effectuate
a defendant's compulsory process rights. In Smith, the defendant was denied exculpatory
testimony and therefore was unable to present an effective defense. Id. at 966-70.
76. Id. at 969.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 972-74.
79. The Second Circuit in United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1980),
characterized Smith as "a totally bizarre situation" and urged trial judges to "summarily reject claims for defense witness immunity whenever the witness for whom
immunity is sought is an actual or potential target of prosecution." 623 F.2d at 773,
777-78. The Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Herbst, 641 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1981),
declined to "follow the Third Circuit in fashioning a doctrine of judicial use immunity.
...[Tihe Virgin Islands case is clearly the minority view." 641 F.2d at 1168.
80. See generally United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1982); United
States v. D'Apice, 664 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1981), United States v. Lowell, 649 F.2d 950
(3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Herbst, 641 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1981); United States
v. Cohen, 631 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1980); Grochulski v. Henderson, 637 F.2d 50 (2d Cir.
1980); United States v. Horwitz, 622 F.2d 1101 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Turkish,
623 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Lenz, 616 F.2d 960 (6th Cir. 1980).
81. 641 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1981).
82. Id. at 1169.
83. Id. at 1168.
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noting that the Fifth Circuit had never been called upon to decide
this issue."
In United States v. D'Apice," the defendant refused to testify at
a co-defendant's trial" after having been granted use immunity by
the district court over the prosecution's objection.' D'Apice previously
had agreed to testify if he was granted use immunity and was tried
before his co-defendant. The Fifth Circuit refused to follow the trial
court and denied the grant of use immunity;89 however, the constitutional issues9 were not presented to the court.
The first case to clearly present the constitutional issues' to the
court was United States v. Thevis.9' In Thevis, the Fifth Circuit denied
the due process claim to use immunity, 3 holding that due process does
not require a grant of use immunity to a defense witness simply
because the witness has exculpatory information unavailable from.
other sources." The court in Thevis left to Congress the decision of
whether use immunity should be used to abrogate the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The compulsory process
84. Id. at 1169.
85. 664 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1981).
86. Id. at 76.
87. The district court was prepared to grant the request for use immunity, after
having asked government attorneys if they would apply for statutory immunity under
18 U.S.C. SS 6001, 6003. The government refused, and the court announced that use
immunity would be granted to the defense witness. The government then notified the
court that if the defendant testified, his testimony would not be used against him
in a subsequent prosecution. Id. at 76.
88. The defendant stated under oath that he was willing to testify if granted use
immunity and a trial date before his co-defendant's. At a co-defendant's trial, the defendant refused to testify, claiming that the trial court's conferral of use immunity was
void and the government's promise not to use his testimony against him was not binding outside the district. Id. at 76.
89. Id. at 77.
90. The constitutional issues were defined by the court as whether the co-defendant
requesting use immunity was denied the constitutional rights to a fair trial and to
compulsory attendance of witnesses. Id. at- 77.
91. The constitutional issues were defined by the Fifth Circuit in United States
v. D'Apice, 664 U.S. 75, 77 (5th Cir. 1981), and United States v. Herbst, 641 F. 1161,
1169 (5th Cir. 1981),. as the due process right to a fair trial and the compulsory process right to present a defense.
92. 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1982).
93. Id. at 639, 641.
94. Id. at 639.
95. The court agreed that the immunity decision required a balancing of public
interests, but concluded that "the potential interference [with important public interests]
is nevertheless great enough that the legislature, rather than the courts, should decide
on such a course." Id. at 640.
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argument was not raised in Thevis;9' however, recently the Fifth Circuit answered the compulsory process argument in United States v.
Chagra.7
In Chagra, the appellant asked the trial court to grant use immunity to a witness implicated in the crime by the testimony of a
government witness. The district court refused to grant use immunity
or to order the government to do so." In upholding the trial court's
decision, the court noted, "We do not believe that the compulsory
process clause supports the appellant's position [that he was denied
a fair trial by the court's refusal to grant use immunity]." 99
In answering the compulsory process claim, the Fifth Circuit noted
that the text of the clause, 00 the history of the clause,"' the case law
interpreting the clause,0 2 and the "right to present a defense"'0 3 fail
to support the appellant's claim for defense witness immunity.
The court, however, appeared to limit its decision in Chagra to
the specific facts of the case, stating, "In conclusion, under the present circumstances, we can find no constitutional basis for the defendant's right to demand that the government offer transactional or use
96.
pulsory
by the
97.
98.
99.
100.

The court's reference only to the due process argument implies that the comprocess argument either was not addressed by the court or was not raised
parties. Id. at 639.
669 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 258.
Id. at 259.
The court interpreted the language of the clause as preserving "a defendant's

common law right to subpoena witnesses for his defense at trial ....

[The] clause

does not suggest a right to supersede a witness' invocation of his own fifth amendment privilege ...... ;Id. at 259-60. But cf. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967),
where the Supreme Court noted "that the Sixth Amendment was designed in part
to make the testimony of a defendant's witnesses admissible on his behalf in court
...."388 U.S. at 22. See note 11, supra, and accompanying text.
101. "[H]istory demonstrates . . .that the clause was designed to ensure that a
defendant would have the subpoena power available for his defense rather than to
669 F.2d at
guarantee a defendant the unlimited right to present a defense .
260. But see note 54, supra, and accompanying text.
102. The court noted that compulsory process cases had dealt with governmental
rules of evidence designed to exclude unreliable testimony and the government's refusal
to provide evidence based upon a claim of privilege. The court distinguished the present case because the case involved the fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination, which was designed to "exclude even highly reliable evidence in order
to promote social goals." The court also noted that the present case involved a witness
interposing a claim of privilege between himself and the defendant, rather than between himself and the government. 669 F.2d at 260.
103. Id. at 260. But see Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967); United States
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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immunity to his witness.""' It should be noted that there is no indication in the decision as to the material or exculpatory nature of the
testimony sought by the appellant. The defense merely wanted to question him concerning his knowledge of and participation in the crime.' 5
The Fifth Circuit reiterated the position taken in Thevis that "the
federal constitution may in some extraordinary circumstances require
either defense witness immunity or some remedial action by a district
court to protect a defendant's right to a fair trial." ' The Chagra case
did not present such circumstances.
The appellant also had asked the district court to grant use immunity under the federal immunity statutes, °7 claiming the court's
refusal to do so violated his right to a fair trial. Compulsory process,
however, guarantees the defendant the right to present a defense,
not the right to force the court to grant use immunity under the
federal statutes. Compulsory process should guarantee the defendant
the right to request that material, exculpatory testimony be admitted
through a grant of use immunity by the trial court when the witness
has invoked a valid fifth amendment claim of privilege.
In Louisiana, the right to defense witness immunity was raised
for the first time in a concurring opinion by Justice Lemmon, in State
v. Bice."8 The defendant sought to introduce the testimony of a coparticipant in the case; however, the witness refused to testify, claiming his privilege against self-incrimination. Both the defense counsel
and the prosecutor believed the witness to be in possession of exculpatory testimony."'1 The defendant was convicted without the introduction of the testimony;"' however, the supreme court reversed
and remanded the case to the trial court to determine the content
of the testimony."' In his concurring opinion, Justice Lemmon pointed
104. 669 F.2d at 261.
105. Id. at 258.
106. 669 F.2d at 258.
107. See note 22, supra.
108. 390 So. 2d 1270 (La. 1980).
109. In Bice, the defendant sought to introduce testimony that he had "helped in
the planning, but did not directly participate in the assault on the victim." The witness,
who had charges pending against him, refused to testify for fear of self-incrimination.
Id. at 1271.
110. Id. at 1270-71.
111. The defendant applied to the trial court for a new trial hoping to place the
evidence before the jury on "a claim for newly discovered evidence." The trial judge
denied the motion, but the supreme court remanded the case for a rehearing on the
motion. The trial court was instructed to "determine in the context of the entire record
whether [the] testimony is so compelling that it ought to produce a different result
before a different jury." Id. at 1272. Upon remand, the witness invoked his privilege
against self-incrimination, "justifying his refusal on grounds of a recent habeas peti-
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to the fundamental unfairness of the prosecution's effectually
precluding testimony favorable to the accused by placing the defense
witness in a position
where, by giving his testimony, he must in12
criminate himself.
In State v. Wilson,"' the Louisiana Supreme Court was faced with
a compulsory process violation when the prosecutor and the trial judge
interrupted defense counsel's direct examination of a. witness."' The
witness claimed his privilege against self-incrimination and was allowed5
to leave the witness stand without answering any further questions.
The supreme court ordered a new trial to allow defense counsel to
question the witness on matters not within the scope of his privilege
against self-incrimination."' A majority of the court refused to address
the issue of defense witness immunity since the issue was not squarely
before them. Justice Lemmon, in his concurring opinion, however,
noted that defense witness immunity could be one solution to the problem presented in the case." 7
In the instant case, the issue of defense witness immunity was
presented squarely to the supreme court."8 Mattheson sought to in.
troduce testimony crucial to his case;" 9 he was prevented from doing
so by a witness' valid claim of fifth amendment privilege. Defense
counsel sought to obtain the testimony through a judicial grant of
use immunity." The evidence Mattheson sought to introduce pertained
to his mental state at the time of the crime and possibly to the "sequence of events which culminated in the shooting""' of the victim.
tion filed in his behalf." Upon appeal to the supreme court, the trial court's refusal
to grant a new trial was upheld. State v. Bice, 407 So. 2d 1234, 1236-37 (La. 1982).
112. 390 So. 2d at 1272.
113. 394 So. 2d 254 (La. 1981).
114. Defense counsel's direct examination of the witness was interrupted by the
trial judge and the prosecutor to inform the witness of his fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. Id. at 257.
115. Id..
116. Id. at 259.
117. Id.
118. State v. Mattheson, 407 So. 2d 1150, 1160-61 (La. 1981).
119. The witness' attorney, out of the presence of the jury, testified that he believed the witness to be in possession of information exculpatory as to any intent of the
defendant to kill during the perpetration of the crime. This evidence was crucial to
the defendant's case, considering the prosecution's comments intimating that the defendant had gone to the salon to kill everyone present but did not have enough ammunition. Brief for 'defendant at 5, 10; State v. Mattheson, 407 So. 2d 1150 (La. 1981).
120. 407 So. 2d at 1160-61.
121. [T]he defendant testified that he was both intoxicated and under the influence
of LSD at the time of the incident. His version of the incident was that the receptionist had poked at the gun. . . . and that it had gone off as she grabbed for
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The witness, Mattheson's wife, was the only person who could possibly
testify concerning his mental state at the time of crime. 22'
Mattheson sought to prove that he did not have the requisite
"specific intent" required for a conviction of first-degree murder
because he had taken LSD and had consumed a large amount of alcohol
before the commission of the crime."= As Mattheson's constant companion, the witness was the only person who could testify as to the
amount of alcohol he may have consumed or the drugs he may have
taken. The witness was also the only actual eyewitness to the shooting
of the victim. The state presented two witnesses at trial who testified
that the deceased had not lunged or moved toward Mattheson in any
way prior to the shooting, as Mattheson had claimed."' There was
evidence, however, that due to the layout of the interior of the
building, the witnesses' view may have been distorted.125 Mattheson
was unable to rebut the testimony of the state's witnesses or to
substantiate his own claim without his wife's testimony. The evidence
Mattheson sought to introduce was believed to be exculpatory as to
the first-degree murder charge 26 and material to his defense, as the
witness was the only person who could testify as to what actually
happened at the time of the shooting. Such material and exculpatory
evidence is precisely the type of evidence that compulsory process
demands be introduced.
In upholding the trial court's refusal to grant use immunity to
the defense witness, the supreme court construed the compulsory process clause as guaranteeing "the right [of a defendant] to bring his
witness to court, and have the witness' non-privileged testimony
heard," '27 but not the right to displace the privilege against selfit ....He had no witness to call other than his wife [to corroborate his testimony]
Brief for defendant at 10; State v. Mattheson, 407 So. 2d 1150 (La. 1981).
122. Id.
123. 407 So. 2d at 1155-56.
124. One witness testified "that she did not see [the victim] lunge at defendant
or move at any time prior to being shot." The second witness "testified that she did
not see [the victim] grab the gun and the victim was not moving at the time of the
shooting." Id. at 1170 (Calogero, J., dissenting).
125. "According to the witnesses who were in the beauty shop, the working area
is located up a few steps from the level at which the [victim] was working. Consequently, people on the upper level might have a distorted or incomplete view of what
occurs on the lower level." One witness testified that she saw the events "all together"
and not in any sequence prior to the shooting; and the other witness was located upon
the upper level. Id. at 1170 (Calogero, J., dissenting).
126. See note 121, supra, and accompanying text.
127. 407 So. 2d at 1160-61.
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incrimination. The court interpreted the right to present a defense
as the right to testimony not protected by the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. In limiting a defendant's compulsory process rights by the privilege against self-incrimination, the
court failed to recognize that both rights could be protected by granting the defendant the right to obtain use immunity.
The supreme court also failed to make a distinction between article
I, S 16 of the Louisiana Constitution, granting the "right to present
12
and the sixth amendment to the United States
a defense,""
9
The
Louisiana Supreme Court noted only that article
Constitution."
construed to grant a right to defense witness
been
had
never
I, S 16
3
that this is too limited a view. Article
is
submitted
immunity. ' It
I, 5 16 of the Louisiana Constitution is more specific than the sixth
amendment to the United States Consititution. The latter grants a
defendant the right to compulsory process, which is interpreted as
the right to present a defense,' while the Louisiana Constitution
specifically enumerates the right to present a defense, as well as the
rights of confrontation and compulsory attendance of witnesses.132 It
is submitted that article I, § 16 of the Louisiana Constitution was
intended to give the defendant greater rights than he would have
under the United States Constitution, thus giving the defendant the
right to material and exculpatory evidence through a grant of use
immunity.
The state can compel testimony favorable to its case under article 439.1 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure; 33' the defen128. Every person charged with a crime is presumed innocent until proven guilty
and is entitled to a speedy, public, and impartial trial in the parish where the
offense or an element of the offense occurred, unless venue is changed in accordance with law. No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself.
An accused is entitled to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him,
to compel the attendance of witnesses, to present a defense and to testify in his
own behalf.
LA. CONST. art. I, S 16.
129. See note 4, supra.
130. 407 So. 2d at 1160-61.
131. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967).
132. See note 128, supra.
133. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 439.1 reads,
A. In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to testify
or provide other information at any proceeding before or ancillary to a grand
jury of the state, at any proceeding before a court of this state, or in response
to any subpoena by the attorney general or district attorney, the judicial
district court of the district in which the proceeding is or may be held shall
issue, in accordance with Subsection B of this article, upon the request of
the attorney general together with the district attorney for such district,
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dant, under Mattheson, is denied such a right. If the government can
obtain use immunity to prosecute the guilty, the defendant ought to
be granted the same right to exonerate the innocent, namely himself."5
If the defendant's right to present a defense is limited to the right
to testimony not protected by the privilege against self-incrimination,
criminal trials become a "search for the truth" ' without means to
obtain all the material facts. It is submitted that, under certain circumstances, defendants ought to have the power to compel testimony
in their favor, over government objection, by a judicial grant of use
immunity.
Interest in subsequent prosecution of the witness appears to be
both the government's main objection to use immunity and the basis
for the court's decision in Mattheson. The court will deem the trial
judge correct in rejecting claims for defense witness immunity when,
as in Mattheson, the witness is an actual or potential target of
prosecution. ' As a result, Mattheson may be construed as giving the
defendant the right to obtain use immunity for a witness when the
witness has pled guilty, been convicted, or had the charges against
him dropped. Further, the court's opinion may be interpreted to give
the defendant the right to obtain use immunity if substantial prejudice
or prosecutorial misconduct occurs. ' The majority of cases where
an order requiring such individual to give testimony or provide other informatyn which he refuses to give or provide on the basis of his privilege against
self-Incrimination, such order to become effective as provided in Subsection
C of this article.
B. The attorney general together with the district attorney may request
an order under Subsection A of this article when in his judgment
(1) the testimony or other information from such individual may be necessary
to the public interest; and
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide
other information on the basis of his privilege against self incrimination.
C. The witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of
his privilege against self-incrimination, but no testimony or other information compelled under the order, or any information directly or indirectly
derived from such testimony or other information, may be used against the
witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false
statement or otherwise failing to comply with the order.
D. Whoever refuses to comply with an order as hereinabove provided shall
be adjudged in contempt of court and punished as provided by law.
134. See Note, supra note 35, at 70.
135. But cf. United States v, Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 775 (2d Cir. 1980). The court
acknowledges the need for important facts shielded from disclosure by a lawful privilege;
however, the court views the substantial obstacles .to successful prosecution of the
protected witness and the possibility of inviting cooperative perjury among law violators
as public concerns which outweigh the public interest in the pursuit of truth. Id. at 775.
136. 407 So. 2d at 1161.
137. Id. at 1160-61.
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defense witness immunity is needed, however, involve co-participants
who have charges pending against them. As such, the court's opinion
gives defendants very little, if any, remedy.
The government strongly objects to giving defendants such a
remedy for two reasons:
(1) the impossibility of subsequent prosecution of a witness who
has been granted use immunity; 8'
(2) the possibility that co-defendants will use immunity to exonerate
each other at trial. 39
These are valid interests on the government's part; nevertheless, they
are not compelling enough to prevent the defendant from exercising
his compulsory process rights under certain limited circumstances. In
Kastigarv. United States,"' the Supreme Court upheld "use" immunity
statutes allowing the government to prosecute immunized witnesses
by proving that "the evidence it proposes to use is derived from a
legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled testimony.'.
Kastigar prohibits the government from using the compelled testimony
as an "investigatory lead"'4 to gain evidence from the compelled
testimony to use against the witness in a subsequent prosecution. The
government argues that the Kastigar burden is too difficult to sustain in the subsequent prosecution of a defense witness because of
the necessity of proving independent sources for all the evidence
used.' Though the Supreme Court has not ruled on the burden of
proof necessary to satisfy the Kastigar test, lower courts hive held
establishment by a preponderance of the evidence sufficient.'4' Thus,
the government need not prove an "independent source" of the
evidence used beyond a reasonable doubt, but only by a preponderance
of the evidence."' The government agrees to sustain the Kastigar
burden for its own immunized witnesses; however, it unfairly refuses
to sustain the burden for immunized defense witnesses. Kastigar can
See sources cited in note 35, supra.
See United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 775-76 (2d Cir. 1980).
406 U.S. 441 (1972).
Id. at 460.
Id.
Id.
See Flanagan, supra note 35, at 458 n.83.
"Evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than the evidence
which is offered in opposition to it ....
[Tihe fact sought to be proved is more probable than not." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1064 (5th ed. 1979). This is in contrast to the
government's burden in criminal trials to prove the guilt or innocence of the accused
"beyond a reasonable doubt" (i.e., fully satisfied, entirely convinced, clear, precise, indubitable). BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 147 (5th ed. 1979).
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
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be construed as guaranteeing the government access to all material
and relevant evidence in possession of a "privileged"1" witness, without
giving up its right to subsequent prosecution. This right could easily
be extended to the defendant who is in need of testimony crucial to
his case in the possession of a "privileged" witness by granting him
the power to obtain use immunity. The government would still have
the right to prosecute the immunized witness, and the defendant would
obtain possession of testimony crucial to his case.
If defendants are given the right to obtain use immunity for
defense witnesses, the government's burden could be eased in two
ways:
(1) requiring the sealing and dating of all evidence obtained against
the defense witness prior to the grant of immunity; " '
(2) limiting the scope of the compelled testimony by the trial judge
to give the prosecution greater freedom in investigating the
14 8

defense witness.

The government then would need to prove only an "independent
source" for any evidence obtained after the date the testimony was
sealed, and since the scope of the testimony was limited, proving an
independent source would be less burdensome. The more limited the
scope of the testimony, the easier it is to prove the evidence used
was not derived from the use of that testimony.
Thegovernment also contends that co-defendants granted use immunity will falsely accept sole responsibility for the crime, effectively
exonerating each other. The government's fears are well-founded, but
the problem of perjured testimony is one the courts face in every
criminal trial and one they are well-equipped to handle. "9 The immunity statutes 5 ' specifically exclude perjured testimony from protection, enabling the government subsequently to prosecute the
witness as if immunity had never been granted. The court should deal
146. "Privileged" in this context is taken to mean one who is in possession of information protected by the privilege against self-incrimination. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
147. See Comment, supra note 35, at 395.
148. But cf Flanagan, supra note 35, at 457. It is submitted that limiting the witness'
testimony to ease the government's burden of proving independent source is a viable
solution. By limiting the scope of the immunized testimony, the government would
have a less difficult problem proving the witness' testimony was not used as an investigatory lead for the evidence obtained. The government would then be forced to
decide whether to enlarge the scope of the immunized testimony by impeaching the
witness upon cross-examination.
1149. See Note, supra note 35, at 81-82.
150. See notes 22 & 133, supra.
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with the problem of the truthfulness of testimony as in any other
criminal trial-a question of fact for the jury to decide. 51' Jurors
presently decide the credibility of immunized government witnesses
and are therefore quite capable of judging the credibility of an immunized defense witness.
In Mattheson, the Louisiana Supreme Court apparently considered
the government's interest in subsequent prosecution compelling enough
to prevent the defendant from obtaining use immunity for his witness.
The court could have granted Mattheson's request for use immunity.
All the evidence obtained against the defense witness could have been
sealed and dated prior to the grant of immunity. The trial judge could
have limited the defense witness' testimony to only those facts concerning the defendant's mental state at the time of the crime and
the chain of events occurring between the time the two entered the
salon and the shooting of the victim.
The case should have been remanded to the trial court with appropriate standards for implementing defense witness immunity. It
has been suggested that the model used in informer privilege cases"5 2
could serve as a basis for the appropriate standards to review a grant
of use immunity. Based upon the suggested procedures, the defendant would be required to request a grant of use immunity prior to
the trial. If the prosecutor refused to concur in the request, an ex
5
parte"
I hearing would be held to allow the defendant to prove that
the testimony sought is material to his case and can not bevobtained
from any source but the prospective defense witness. The testimony
would be deemed material if it would create a reasonable doubt as
to the guilt or innocence of the defendant in the jury's mind."5 All
testimony submitted by the defendant would be sealed, dated, and
kept confidential by the trial judge. If the defendant was prevented
from making his request timely by circumstances beyond his control,
the trial judge could allow the request to be made during trial at
an in camera155 evidentiary hearing. The procedures outlined above
would be followed.
151. See Note, supra note 35, at 81-82.
152. See Note, supra note 35, at 80. The procedures developed by this author were
derived from the suggested procedures of Helen M. McCue, the author of Separation
of Powers and Defense Witness Immunity, 66 GEO. L.J. 51 (1977).
153. In an ex parte hearing, the court only hears one side of the controversy. Ex
parte is defined as "on one side only" or "on application of one party." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 517 (5th ed. 1979).
154. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
155. An in camera hearing is held in the judge's private chamber, not open to
the public or the jury. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 684 (5th ed. 1979).
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The government, at either an ex parte or in camera hearing, would
then have the opportunity to show that the grant of immunity would
infringe upon its prosecutorial and investigatory functions. The government's evidence would be sealed, dated, and kept confidential. The
trial judge would then decide whether to allow the grant of immunity based upon the defendant's showing of need, weighed against the
government's showing of substantial prejudice to the prosecution of
the witness. If the evidence sought by the defense was material to
the defendant's case and available from a witness who agreed to testify
under a grant of use immunity, the trial judge would grant the defendant's request for defense witness immunity. Following the grant of
immunity, the witness would be compelled to testify as to what he
knew, subject to cross-examination by the prosecution.
One of the aims of our criminal justice system is to insure a fair
trial for the accused. As a former solicitor general has stated, "[T]he
15
government wins its point when justice is done in its courts.""
The
defendant has a right to present his defense under the sixth amendment to the federal constitution and under article I, § 16 of the Louisiana Constitution. The defendant's right to material, relevant, and
exculpatory testimony can be protected reasonably by granting the
defendant the right to obtain use immunity when the appropriate standards are met. It is submitted that the defendant has a right to have
his compulsory process rights protected; the use of defense witness
immunity insures this right.
Louis S. Quinn, Jr.

156. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. at 87 n.2, quoting from a statement made by
Solicitor General Simon E. Sobeloff before the Judicial Conference of the Fourth Circuit on June 29, 1954. (Sobeloff was quoting Frederick William Lehmann, the previous
Solicitor General).

